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Introduction
In multi-agent systems, interactions between agents are of-
ten related to cooperation or competition in such a fashion
that they can fulfil their tasks. Successful interactions of-
ten require agents to share common and unified knowledge
about their working environment. However, autonomous
agents observe and judge their surroundings by their own
view. Consequently, agents possibly have partial and some-
times conflicting descriptions of the world. In scenarios
where they have to coordinate, they are required to identify
the shared knowledge in the group and to be able to reason
with available information. This problem requires more so-
phisticated modelling and reasoning methods, which is be-
yond the classical logics and monotonic reasoning.
We introduce a formal framework based on Defeasible
Logic (DL) to describe the knowledge commonly shared
by agents, and that obtained from other agents. This en-
ables an agent to efficiently reason about the environment
and intentions of other agents given available information.
We propose to extend the reasoning mechanism of DL with
the superior knowledge. This mechanism allows an agent to
integrate its mental attitude with a more trustworthy source
of information such as the knowledge shared by the majority
of other agents.
Literature Review
A well-known and successful approach to model rational
agents, the Beliefs, Desires and Intentions (BDI) architec-
ture is inspired by human attitudes towards actions. Beliefs,
Desires and Intentions are then the mental components in the
architecture (Rao & Georgeff 1991; Kinny, Georgeff, & Rao
1996). This architecture is strongly founded in the philo-
sophical investigation by Bratman on human practical rea-
soning. BDI model provides an insight view to the decision-
making process of an agent. Furthermore, the model facili-
tates building agent systems thanks to its clear definition of
agent functionality.
Generally behaviours of a BDI agent are driven by its
own desires. However, as a member of a group, the agent
is often required to comply with the group “conventions”.
The idea of modifying the BDI architecture by introducing
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deontological properties like laws, norms, and obligations
to place constraints on agents’ behaviours is supported by
several authors (Broersen et al. 2001; Castelfranchi 1998;
Cavedon & Sonenberg 1998; Dignum, Kinny, & Sonenberg
2002). They strongly support that such concepts are an im-
portant factor to “glue” autonomous agents together in a
multi-agent system. The deontological properties are con-
sidered as external influences on individual’s decision mak-
ing and the commitment to other members. These concepts
are very well represented by modal logics but the issue of in-
complete and conflicting information is not fully addressed.
DL (Nute 1987; 1994) has been very well developed over
the years by (Antoniou et al. 2000; 2001; Billington 1993).
In the agent research domain, there is a line of works pro-
poses to use DL to model rational agents (Governatori &
Rotolo 2004; Governatori, Rotolo, & Padmanabhan 2006;
Dastani et al. 2005a; 2005b). In general, DL is an elegant
and computationally efficient tool (Maher 2001; Maher et
al. 2001) to tackle with the issue of partial and conflicting
knowledge. Also, DL provides a compact representation and
an effective way to accommodate new information.
Research Description
Knowledge Representation
In general, each individual agent can take any action driven
by the its desires based on knowledge about the environment
and its perception of other agents’ behaviours. However, as
a member of a group, the agent should be aware of mental
attitudes commonly held among the group and should avoid
actions which can violate desires of the group. By consid-
ering individual knowledge and the “collective wisdom” of
the group, the individual agent can adjust its behaviours ac-
cordingly. Taking this observation into account, we propose
a knowledge structure for an agent, which consists of three
components named background, other members, and inter-
nal knowledge (the agent’s own knowledge).
Consider a group of agents, A = {A1, . . . ,An+1}, and a
weight function, wA : {A1, . . . ,An+1} 7→ R+, representing
importance (reliability) of an agent to the group. An indi-
vidual agent in the group, considering itself as Ame, has the
knowledge structure represented by a set of defeasible theo-
ries
T = {Tbg,Tme,Tother}
• Tbg is the background theory representing the background
knowledge. This knowledge is commonly shared by all
agents, which motivates general (social) behaviours.
• Tme is the internal theory representing the internal knowl-
edge. This component is the agent’s own knowledge
describing its own view about the environment, where
the agent acts. This knowledge enables the agent to au-
tonomously and distinctively achieve its goals.
• Tother is the knowledge obtained from other agents in the
group. This component is also represented as a set of de-
feasible theories Tother = {Ti : 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1 & i 6= me}.
Ti represents Ame’s perception of agent i. Ti’s impor-
tance is derived from that of the corresponding agent
wT (Ti) = wA(Ai). Tother provides a rough understanding
of their possible behaviours.
Majority Knowledge
The majority rule from (Lin 1996) retrieves a maximal
amount of consistent knowledge from a set of agents’ knowl-
edge. Conflicting information among agents can be handled
by considering not only the number of agents supporting that
information but also the importance of the agents. The ap-
proach provides a useful and efficient method to discover
information largely held by agents. This knowledge can be
used either to reinforce the current knowledge of an agent or
to introduce new information into the agent’s knowledge.
Due to possible conflicting information within a source,
the majority rule cannot be directly applied to our frame-
work. Instead, the majority rule pools joint conclusions
derived by the defeasible reasoning. A conclusion c is in
the joint knowledge Tmaj if its weight accumulated from
Ti ∈Tother, which supports c, is greater than half of the total
weight W of the group.
Proposition 1 For any literal q, it is impossible to have both
+∂q and +∆∼q in Tmaj
Due to the nature of DL proofs, conflicts can arise be-
tween strict and defeasible conclusions of a literal and its
negation. However, this proposition claims that the outcome
of the majority rule is still coherent.
As Tmaj is derived from what the agent Ame knows about
the other agents, Tmaj can conflict with Tme (the internal
knowledge of Ame). In the case that Ame joins the major-
ity pool, the greater importance (weight) Ame acquires, the
greater influence it has on the joint knowledge. If the weight
of Ame is greater than W/3, Ame’s support for any conclusion
c is tantamount to half of the group’s support for c. Ame can
have two strategies to handle conflicts :
1. Adaptive strategy if wme ≤ max(W/3). Ame should con-
sider conclusions from the others, since it is unlikely
that Ame can successfully override conflicts from the joint
knowledge. That is Tmaj can introduce new information to
Ame.
2. Collective strategy otherwise. Ame can defeat conflicts
from other agents if Ame joins the pool. Hence the joint
knowledge from the others reinforces the current knowl-
edge of Ame. In order to obtain more knowledge, Ame
should collect all possible consistent knowledge from the
others.
In both strategies, background knowledge commonly
shared by the group is respected; i.e., in case of a conflict be-
tween a conclusion from background knowledge and either
from the majority or the agent’s knowledge, the conclusions,
which are supported by the background part prevail.
Defeasible Reasoning with Superior Knowledge
In this section, we propose a simple method to integrate
two independent defeasible theories. Note that a defeasible
theory has finite sets of facts and rules, and that a deriva-
tion from the theory can be computed in linear time (Maher
2001).
Consider two knowledge sources represented by defeasi-
ble theories labelled as Tsp – the superior theory, and Tme –
the agent’s internal theory. The agent considers that Tsp is
more important than Tme. Thus, conclusions from the in-
ternal theory should be withdrawn if they conflict with the
superior theory; the agent prefers the superior theory’s con-
clusions to its own.
Owing to the transformations of the superiority relation
and defeater rules (Antoniou et al. 2001), we can assume
that the two theories contain only strict and defeasible rules.
To perform the defeasible reasoning, the agent generates a
superiority relation over sets of rules as in Rsps > Rmes ;R
sp
d >
Rmed . In this scheme, the subscript denotes the type of rules(s and d for strict and defeasible respectively) while the su-
perscript indicates the type of the theory which contains the
rules.
A derivation from the two theories is a finite sequence
P = (P(1), . . . ,P(n)) of tagged literals satisfying proof con-
ditions (which correspond to inference rules for each of the
four kinds of conclusion). P(1..i) denotes the initial part of
the sequence P of length i. The definite conclusion, +∆q,
will be derived by performing forward chaining with the
strict rules in the superior theory, or in the internal theory
if the complementary literals cannot be positively proved by
the superior theory.
+∆: If P(i+1) = +∆q then
(1) q ∈ F or
(2) ∃r ∈ Rsps [q] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∆a ∈ P(1..i) or
(3) ∃r′ ∈ Rmes [q] ∀a ∈ A(r
′
) : +∆a ∈ P(1..i) and
∀r ∈ Rsps [∼q] ∃a ∈ A(r) : −∆a ∈ P(1..i)
The conclusions tagged with −∆ mean that the extended
mechanism cannot retrieve a positive proof for the corre-
sponding literals from the strict parts of both theories.
−∆: If P(i+1) =−∆q then
(1) q /∈ F and
(2) ∀r ∈ Rsps [q]∪Rmes [q] ∃a ∈ A(r) : −∆a ∈ P(1..i).
The proof for −∆ implicitly satisfies the principle of
strong negation (Antoniou et al. 2000). The proof, which
strictly complies with that principle, requires an additional
condition such that at least one strict rule from the superior
theory supports the complementary literals. However, this
condition is never met as it violates the coherence property
of the strict rules.
A defeasible conclusion +∂q can either be drawn directly
from definite conclusions, or by investigating the defeasi-
ble part of the integrated theory. The conclusions tagged
with −∂ mean that the extended mechanism cannot retrieve
a positive proof for the corresponding literals from the strict
and defeasible rules of both theories or these conclusions are
rebutted because of “stronger” conclusions. The proof for
+∂q and −∂q complies with the strong negation principle.
+∂ : If P(i+1) = +∂q then either
(1) +∆q ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.1) ∃r ∈ Rspsd [q]∪Rinsd [q] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂a ∈ P(1..i) and(2.2) −∆∼q ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ Rspsd [∼q]∪Rmesd [∼q] either(2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) : −∂a ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ Rspsd [q]∪Rmesd [q] such that t > s and
∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂a ∈ P(1..i)
The extended defeasible reasoning with the superior
knowledge has the properties1
1. If Tsp ⊢ +∆q then Tsp + Tme 6⊢ +∆∼q and Tsp + Tme 6⊢
+∂∼q. If a strict conclusion is derived from the supe-
rior theory, the extended mechanism does not provide any
proof for its negation.
2. If Tsp ⊢ ∼∆∼q and Tme ⊢+∆q then Tsp +Tme ⊢+∂q. The
conclusions from the extended mechanism can violate de-
feasible conclusions obtained from the superior theory if
the agent has a strong evidence of the contradiction in its
internal knowledge.
3. The extended reasoning mechanism is coherent and con-
sistent.
The extended mechanism computes a consistent set of
conclusions with respect to the superior theory. The mech-
anism goes beyond the standard defeasible reasoning since
it extends the superiority relation of rules to that of theo-
ries. This increases the size of theory to be investigated.
Hence the complexity class of the reasoning algorithm (Ma-
her 2001) remains unchanged.
Reasoning Engine
The reasoning mechanism operates in two steps. The first
step is to identify the majority knowledge from the other
agents. In the next step, the agent performs either adaptive
or collective reasoning depending on its weight.
1. Determining the majority knowledge from other agents:
(a) Draw defeasible conclusions from the others with re-
spect to background knowledge.
Tbg +Ti ⊢Ci : 1 ≤ i ≤ n
(b) Establish the majority knowledge Tmaj. The extended
defeasible reasoning already guarantees that conflicts
are removed from the final conclusions. Hence the ma-
jority knowledge can be determined by applying the
majority rule (Lin 1996) over the sets of defeasible con-
clusions, {Ci : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, from the previous step. The
conclusions with support from the majority will be pro-
jected to the joint knowledge.
1The proof for these properties is omitted due to the space limit
2. Reasoning strategies. Depending on the weight, an indi-
vidual agent can either follow the majority knowledge or
collect all possible information. The two strategies are
implemented by the defeasible reasoning with the supe-
rior knowledge.
(a) Adaptive reasoning. At this stage, the set of knowledge
sources is reduced to the background, the majority, and
the agent’s own knowledge. As shown in Figure ??, it
takes two steps to derive the final conclusions. First,
the agent combines the background and its own knowl-
edge by considering these two as the superior knowl-
edge and the internal knowledge respectively. Next, the
joint knowledge from the other agents is used to adjust
the derivation from the first step. That is, the agent
withdraws conclusions which violate the joint knowl-
edge.
Tmaj +(Tbg +Tme) ⊢C
′
me
(b) Collective reasoning. Owing to its importance, the indi-
vidual agent considers itself as dominant over the other
agents. Instead of reinforcing its current knowledge,
the agent derives new knowledge by accumulating all
possible consistent knowledge from the others. This is
achieved by performing the sequence of inference pro-
cesses with the superior theory The sequence starts with
the theory having the minimum weight and takes the next
theory in the order of weight as the superior theory. The
sequence ends with the background theory, which implic-
itly has the maximum weight. This reasoning strategy re-
quires a total order over the weights of agents in the group.
Proposition 2 The complexity of the proposed mechanism
is in the O(n) class.
This property is due to the linear complexity of defeasible
reasoning and majority rule.
Furture Work
In our framework, the information about the weight (rep-
utation) of an agent is initiated by designers. We are de-
veloping a reputation model to update this special knowl-
edge. Generally, behaviours of our agents are driven by
three types of knowledge including the internal knowledge,
knowledge shared by the group and knowledge from other
agents. Knowledge commonly shared or largely recognised
by individuals enables agents to “discover” common val-
ues in the group. Hence agents can justify behaviours of
others. Behaviours for/against the values of the group can
increase/decrease the reputation of the owners. Thanks to
knowledge from others, an agent can reason about intended
actions of other agents. The agent can balance between ac-
tual and intended actions to update the reputation of other
agents. That is by tracking the commitment of individuals to
the group, we can build up a social reputation model for our
agents. The approach provide more quantitative evidences
than interaction rating model proposed by (Sabater & Sierra
2001) or on-line auction systems like eBay.
(Boella et al. 2007) a mechanism for exchanging rule-
based information using FIPA communicative acts. The se-
mantics of communicative acts do not only depend on the
private knowledge of an agent but also on mental attitudes
publicly known by agents. We are investigating to extend
this mechanism in the way that agents can recognise mental
attitudes largely shared by agents. These attitudes should be
considered as an important source for the assertion of com-
ing information.
We are investigating a computer-based tool to simulate
emergency situations where rescue teams are well equipped
with comprehensive emergency procedures but the informa-
tion is incomplete and conflicting. The simulation tool fa-
cilitates studying behaviours of individual members and the
whole team, and the effectiveness of the rescue procedures.
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